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This project investigates the topic of nuclear command and control (C2) as a policy consideration 
for expressing and mitigating nuclear risks.  The research was led by the Virginia Tech Applied 
Research Corporation (VT-ARC) with a sub-award to ANSER's Asia-Pacific Institute.  The 
overall structure for the project revolves around two independent assessments of a stability 
framework proposed in the 2007 book chapter titled, “Nuclear Command and Control in the 
Twenty First Century: Trends, Disparities and the Impact on Stability.”1  
The first independent assessment was conducted by the Decision Support Red Team (DSRT) 
group at VT-ARC and focused on the functional design of the stability framework and the ease 
and accuracy with which it could be used by policy makers.  This assessment was agnostic of 
specific regional and global characteristics and focused on the framework as a tool for expressing 
power dynamics. 
The second independent assessment was conducted by a research team at ANSER and took a 
deeper look at the merit of the stability framework for expressing nuclear stability dynamics in a 
regional (bipolar or multi-polar) context. 
A primary focus of both independent assessments was to determine the overall utility of the 
Framework for its application and use as a tool for constructive discourse by policy makers and 
non-technical personnel. 
Key Findings & Recommendations 
During the course of the assessments that were conducted by the VT-ARC Decision Support Red 
Team (DSRT) and the expert team from ANSER, the following observations, recommendations 
and findings were generated: 
1 Jerome M. Conley, “Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty-first Century: Trends, Disparities, and the 
Impact on Stability,” in Owen C.W. Price and Jenifer Mackby, Eds., Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues (CSIS, 
Washington, DC: 2007). 
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• Nuclear command and control is often overlooked in policy/academic discussions.  As a key 
overarching determinant of whether nuclear weapons are used (and how), this oversight is 
significant. 
• The 2007 Framework/matrix is a simple way to categorize and think about the nuclear 
command and control systems in different countries and should enable more thoughtful 
discussions about the subject, especially among non-technical experts. 
o Subject matter experts may disagree about the relative weight assigned to the various 
control mechanisms, but the Framework gives them a common lexicon and visual 
with which to have that discussion. 
• “Bias” is a feature of one country’s, while “stability” is a feature of the relationship 
between two or more countries.   
• The Framework may reveal biases in a country’s nuclear C2 which are different from its 
stated posture, thus providing a more nuanced view of stability/deterrence. 
o As an example, control measures to prevent unauthorized nuclear use – such as the 
separation of warheads from delivery vehicles during peacetime – may be negated if 
warheads and vehicles are mated during crises (thus elevating the potential for 
unauthorized use). 
• It was determined that a complex control may contain characteristics that are both positive 
and negative. Given this possibility, a complex control (such as a submarine) may be divided 
and considered both negative and positive given the circumstances, or based on the 
operational environment. 
• The original Framework proposes that the synergistic and collaborative sum of all 
controls represents the bias and true intentions of a nuclear program. 
• The 2007 chapter uses the Framework to illuminate several policy recommendations: 
o It is unstable when countries shift to positive procedural controls (e.g. by mating 
warheads with delivery vehicles)  
o Steady-state actions, such as providing technical controls to Pakistan or ensuring 
U.S.-Russia data exchanges, may enhance stability. 
o Nuclear C2 postures for multiple countries can be depicted on a single graphic, thus 
providing a visual tool for comparing capabilities and postures. 
• The splitting of the bottom-right quadrant in the original 2007 Framework served a 
secondary purpose.  That Framework argues that a C2 system which has controls in the left 





(reliant on Positive Procedural Controls) are more unstable or biased toward use.  There is 
potentially merit in having two matrices – one that is blank for evaluating a country’s C2 and 
another with green and red for depicting the argument from the 2007 assessment that certain 
areas of the matrix are more “stable.”  
• The original 2007 Framework is effective for expressing the individual “biases” of a 
country’s nuclear capabilities, but it not an efficient tool for assisting policymakers in 
assessing nuclear stability dynamics between two or more countries (i.e. the interaction 
of each country’s biases): 
o The Framework provides a categorization/visualization, but not an assessment that 
would result in policy options and may therefore not be useful in crisis situations  
o The same policy recommendations could be made without the Framework. 
• The Framework, in providing general categorizations for nuclear C2 systems, may overlook 
key details unique to each country’s C2 system: 
o The Framework encourages people to make generalizations about countries and 
debate where a certain country (or a certain case study) falls on the Matrix. 
o This may be a useful academic exercise, but policymakers may prefer to have an in-
depth analysis of each country’s C2 system since there are only nine with nuclear 
weapons. 
o For example, a DOTMLPF-P analysis could provide an alternative “framework” for 
analyzing and comparing each aspect of a country’s C2 system and then identifying 
gaps that could be filled.  An example of this approach is provided in the Annex. 
• The quantitative nature of the Matrix may lead to qualitative errors in determining biases.  
o For example, if an audience does not understand the value of one control over 
another, the quantity of controls visually represented in the Matrix may mislead an 
audience to disagree with the bias if specific controls carry more weight than other 
controls.  
o Moreover, if a nuclear program contains fewer, yet more impactful negative controls 
than positive controls, the bias will be viewed toward non-use.  However, when 
depicted on the Matrix, the negative controls appear to be fewer than positive 
controls; the audience may disagree with a non-use bias and the Matrix could lose 
credibility.   
o Ultimately the value of the framework may be that it allows experts to have a 





where the bias falls on the matrix (there is no “right” answer), but they can use the 
framework to express their disagreements using the same lexicon. 
• C2, although important, is only one aspect of nuclear stability dynamics. 
o Presence or lack of positive/negative controls may contribute to a state’s bias toward 
use, but so do its operational environment and defensive viability.  A state’s nuclear 
stability is more likely a reflection of its adversaries’ intent, capability and means. 
o The Framework notes that a “use bias” in a country’s nuclear C2 system does not 
mean that nuclear weapons will be used. This point needs to be strongly emphasized 
so that observers do not get the impression that the Matrix determines how a country 
will react in a crisis. 
o Positive and Negative controls are only as effective as the underlying stability of the 
governing apparatus.  The framework assumes a certain level of political stability and 
civil/military control as assertive or delegatory. 
 
The following sections contain the detailed research results which were generated by the two 






Decision Support Red Team Assessment2 
This Assessment analyzes the Nuclear Command and Control (C2) Framework proposed by 
Jerome Conley in 2007.3  The critical aspects of the evaluation are twofold:  
1) Determine the overall utility of the Framework for its application and use as a tool for 
constructive discourse by policy makers and non-technical personnel; and 
2) Identify gaps within the original Framework and propose potential solutions to address 
those gaps which are uncovered. 
 
Throughout the Assessment, the VT-ARC Decision Support Red Team (DSRT) was unable to 
identify a comparable, competing Framework that could be used in the context of expressing 
policy dialogue around nuclear C2 and stability topics.4  In the absence of a comparable, 
competing Framework, the DSRT determined the concept was a novel approach for assessing a 
nuclear program and its corresponding C2 structure as it relates to nuclear stability.5  Based on 
the determination of the overall potential validity of the Framework, the Team deconstructed and 
analyzed the various components within the Framework (terms, definitions, visualizations, 
parameters, etc…). The Team was then able to identify several pertinent gaps, however, which 
slightly deviated from its intended goal of providing a package that uses simple language and 
visuals to support non-technical bilateral discussion(s), while also being flexible enough to 
enable discussion from a wide subset of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). 
2 Most of the original content and findings from the DSRT are preserved within this section.  In situations where 
there are potential opposing perspectives to points made by the Red Team, these alternate interpretations are called 
out.  
3 Conley,  “Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty-First Century: Trends, Disparities and the Impact on 
Stability”, Owen C.W. Price and Jenifer Mackby, Eds., Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues, 2007 
4 Although it may be technically correct that there are no known Frameworks which are dedicated to the expression 
of the role of nuclear command and control within stability dynamics, other methods of analysis could be applied to 
determine these relationships, such as DOTMLPF-P analysis.  See the Annex for further details. 
5 A counter-point made by the ANSER team is that an assessment of stability dynamics surrounding a nuclear 
program must include other factors, such as non-nuclear capability, weapon reliability, declaratory policy, etc.  
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The major gaps identified include several key concepts that were either improperly defined or 
appeared to cause confusion when initially examined.  Additionally, the original graphics (e.g. 
Matrices) were not robust enough and lacked clarity, especially when used to delineate certain 
cases where some positive controls can have a bias towards non-use, as an example.  In order to 
address these issues, the Team proposed alternative definitions to the parameters based on 
information uncovered and gleaned from other resources so as to enhance matrix clarity. 
Based on the results of this Assessment, the Team proposes that the revised Framework be 
applied to real-world nuclear stability scenarios to further assess the applicability of the 
Framework beyond a theoretical context.  If then deemed applicable, this Framework will 
provide policy makers with an improved means by which to understand and place into proper 
context the complex nature of nuclear stability dynamics.  Using commonly understood variables 
outlined in this Assessment, the Framework will also serve as a mechanism by which to discuss 
and assess policy options geared towards promoting greater nuclear stability.6  
Background 
In the wake of North Korea’s third nuclear test, policy-makers and military strategists in the 
West and the Asia-Pacific region continue to explore options for halting or dampening the 
nuclear ambitions of the reclusive regime.  With much focus on North Korean delivery vehicles 
and warheads, as well as defensive intercept options for those countries held at risk, little public 
attention has been given to safety and security options which address the North Korean C2 
system.  Similar concerns over nuclear safety and security have also been raised in Pakistan – 
and recently in India – due to domestic insurgent threats and simmering bilateral tensions.  In the 
absence of realistic methods to force the roll-back of these nuclear programs, all avenues must be 
explored to ensure non-use of nuclear capabilities, which is the same underlying purpose of 
6 In its review of this DSRT assessment, the ANSER team concluded that it was not convinced that the Framework 
is a useful tool for policy makers. There are only nine countries assessed as nuclear capable and each one of these 
countries is unique within its operating environment and the circumstances behind their need for nuclear weapons.  
Given the relatively small number of nuclear capable countries, the need for a general framework to determine 
nuclear command & control stability is better served by rigorous country analysis and not a generic matrix that 
likely tells a policy maker what he or she already knows.  Instead, this framework may be valuable in facilitating 
dialogue within academia to discuss the attributes and characteristics of a nuclear C2 structure in a neutral OE. 
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“global zero” initiatives.  Sitting at the nexus of all scenarios in which authorized and 
unauthorized use may occur, nuclear C2 provides potential insight into the disposition and 
stability of these nuclear forces. 
The academic and policy debates concerning nuclear deterrence theory and nonproliferation 
typically focus on the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the nuclear warheads and delivery 
vehicles possessed by countries.  A potentially more important indicator of strategic stability and 
intent, however, are the C2 systems that define, shape, and govern the actions and overall 
capabilities of the world’s nuclear custodians. Specifically, the procedural and technical 
measures used to ensure nuclear weapon safety, security, and reliability must strike a delicate 
balance between guaranteeing weapon employment when properly authorized, and avoiding 
weapon detonation in all cases where proper authorization is not provided.  
Nuclear weapons remain a critical – though often unspoken – component of the international 
security environment.  Since the end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 focus on counter-
terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, the role of nuclear weapons has been a topic held 
largely outside of the public dialogue in the United States and one mostly relegated to internal 
governmental reviews.  This is not to imply, however, that significant changes have not occurred 
in the posturing of nuclear weapons around the world, nor that nuclear weapons do not hold 
larger political significance and public profile in other countries. Rather, the limited press 
coverage concerning nuclear weapons appears to center on the developing programs in North 
Korea and Iran, as well as periodic updates on the slow reduction of active nuclear stockpiles in 
the United States and Russia. In general, these discussions all focus on the existence and 
quantities of nuclear weapons in various countries.  Absent from most discussions and analyses, 
however, is a deeper exploration and dialogue on the C2 procedures, policies, and stability of 
these developing nuclear programs. 
Deconstructing the measures and procedures which constitute a government’s C2 policy can 
provide considerable insight into the strategic positioning of that government’s nuclear C2 





stability dynamics.  As a counterpoint to the majority of nuclear policy research that has typically 
quantified metrics based on quantity and quality of nuclear stockpiles, a Nuclear Command, 
Control, and Stability Framework (to be referred to therein as the Framework) was proposed in 
2007 that focuses on the relationship between C2 procedures and stability dynamics in “Nuclear 
Command and Control in the Twenty-first Century: Trends, Disparities, and the Impact on 
Stability,” as published in Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues (CSIS, Washington, DC: 2007). 
Therein, two (2) avenues through which a nuclear command and control system can be 
characterized are detailed: measures (either technical or procedural) and controls (either negative 
or positive). (See Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Example Technical and Procedural Negative and Positive Controls 
 
The original Framework proposes that the synergistic and collaborative sum of all controls 
represents the biases and true intentions of a nuclear program.  Accompanying this 
contention is a Nuclear Command, Control, and Stability Matrix (to be referred to herein as the 
Matrix) diagram that displays the four (4) possible controls (e.g. negative, positive, technical and 
procedural) which are depicted as potential drivers to the stability of a nuclear C2 program 






Figure 2. Conley’s Nuclear Command, Control, and Stability Matrix (2007) 
 
The purpose of the Framework serves to not only emphasize an alternative perspective to 
determine the stability of a nuclear C2 system, but to also create a platform by which domestic 
and international experts from a wide range of non-technical nuclear backgrounds (e.g. policy, 
strategy, other governmental support personnel, etc.) can examine and discuss the ramifications 
and complexity of nuclear controls and measures.  
DSRT Research Approach 
The Nuclear Command & Control Framework was constructed as an enterprise to spur thought 
and bilateral (and multilateral) discussions regarding the dynamics of nuclear stability, strategic 
intent, and C2 between policy makers and other non-technical experts across the domestic and 
global communities.  Given the novelty of the ideas and concepts within the Framework, the 
Team conducted a critical review and analysis of the Framework by identifying/validating its 
assumptions and limitations to determine its applicability and viability as a tool for policy and 





1. Synthesize information and comprehensively vet the Framework, the Matrix, and the 
complexity of nuclear bias and stability; 
2. Adjust the Framework (if necessary) to support a broader multilateral, unclassified, and 
non-technical audience; 
3. Test and evaluate the concepts of the Framework by applying the Matrix to the 
risks/trends of developing nuclear programs; and, 
4. If necessary, identify and provide SMEs and/or additional expertise from the technical 
community to review and further vet the Framework. 
DSRT Research Method 
To meet the previously outlined goals, the Team conducted a critical review of the Framework 
from the perspectives of concept and application.  The Team approached the concept review by 
identifying and analyzing the parameters and definitions of the Framework in order to discover 
gaps which may have existed in the language and concept.  Next, the Team reviewed the 
Framework using case studies which tested and evaluated the value and applicability of the 
Matrix quad chart in scenario-based environments.  Together, these perspectives served to 
provide a more holistic approach to the Team’s task of evaluating the primary objectives of the 
original Framework by challenging not only the design, intentions, and concepts of the 
Framework, but also its utility and practicality.  The Team used these findings to provide 
constructive technical feedback that could be used to improve the Framework’s utility and 
ultimate acceptance from the larger potential user community. 
Concept Review 
To assess the Framework, the Team used a bottom-up approach to focus on the Framework’s 
parameters, thereby developing a clear and concise understanding of the Framework’s intentions 
prior to examining its complexity.  By first isolating the concepts of the Framework, the Team 
could more clearly identify limitations in the logic and rationale behind the parameters put forth. 
Once these were defined, the Team compared the parameters to other references pertaining to the 
use and discussion of controls and structures in the context of a nuclear program.  The Team 





definitions of key terms for consistency of use and recognition within the larger nuclear policy 
and operational communities.7  To reduce the potential for misinterpretation of terms, the Team 
further sought additional references, SMEs, etc., to help refine critical parameters to assure 
clarity.  The following sections detail the parameters, definitions, and gaps the Team identified 
from within the Framework, and the actions proposed to improve the Framework. 
Framework Parameters 
The Team reviewed and analyzed the parameters within “Nuclear Command and Control in the 
Twenty-First Century: Trends, Disparities and the Impact on Stability,” as published in Debating 
21st Century Nuclear Issues (CSIS, Washington, DC: 2007) and compared these definitions with 
other well-known and published references.  Upon review of the key terms, the Team identified 
language within the Framework which required clarity.  The Team compared these definitions 
with other resources to identify gaps and provided alternative language to update or refine 
several key parameters.  These references included books such as Strategic Command and 
Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat by Bruce Blair, Governing the Bomb: Civilian Control 
and Democratic Accountability of Nuclear Weapons by Oxford University, and C3: Nuclear 
Command, Control, Cooperation by Valery Yarynich; and articles such as “A National 
Command and Control Network for India in View of Pakistan and China,” by Bhushan, and 
“Command and Control Trends and Choices for the Next Decade in South Asia,” by Clary.  The 
Team used these secondary sources to clarify parameters of the original Framework where 
language may have been outdated and/or potentially unclear.  The Team then proposed 
alternative language in Table 1 to improve clarity of meaning for the following definitions for 
the Framework.  Finally, the Team used these proposed parameters and revisions to conduct the 
remainder of this Assessment.8 
7 It is acknowledged, however, that terminology is not consistent between the operational and policy communities 
within the United States as well as internationally. 
8 Conley,  “Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty-First Century: Trends, Disparities and the Impact on 
Stability”, Owen C.W. Price and Jenifer Mackby, Eds., Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues, 2007; Blair (1985) 
Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute; Born, 
Gill, Hanggi, (2010) Governing the Bomb: Civilian Control and Democratic Accountability of Nuclear Weapons, 
New York: Oxford University Press; Yarnich (2003) C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation, Center for 
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Command and Control Command and Control: The exercise of authority 
and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in 
the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1-02). 
Negative Controls Controls put in place that assure a nuclear 
capability is unavailable when not authorized.  
The prevention of unauthorized nuclear use. 
Positive Controls Controls put in place that assure a nuclear 
capability is available when authorized. 
Procedural Controls Controls put in place which are measures to 
govern operations, personnel, authority, 
communications, and strategy. 
Technical Controls Controls put in place which are measures to 
govern equipment, facilities, systems, or any 
other non-human elements.  
Posture A formal position for international awareness and 
deterrence that defines a country’s nuclear 
weapon response strategy (e.g. no-first use 
posture, delayed posture, launch on warning 
posture).  Can also refer to a deployment posture. 
Bias Nuclear Bias A tendency or predisposition inherent to the C2 
Defense Information; Bhushan, “A National Command and Control Network for India in View of Pakistan and 
China,” Clary, “Command and Control Trends and Choices for the Next Decade in South Asia”, Nuclear Learning: 
The Next Decade in South Asia; The Naval Post Graduate School , 2012. 
15 
UNCLASSIFIED 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
infrastructure of a nuclear program.  
Nuclear Non-Bias A lack of tendency or predisposition inherent to 
the C2 infrastructure of a nuclear program. 
Nuclear Non-Use Bias A tendency or predisposition to not-use nuclear 
weapons when negative controls are more 
numerous or significant than positive controls. 
Nuclear Use Bias A tendency or predisposition to use nuclear 
weapons when positive controls are more 
numerous or significant than negative controls.  
Nuclear Stability 1. Internal to a country – a non-bias for nuclear 
use or non-use.  A consistent, secure, reliable, 
prepared, enduring, flexible, and maintainable 
system to manage, organize, control, and 
command nuclear weapons.9 
2. External to a country – a feature of the 
relationship between nuclear-armed states.  
Nuclear Stability Dynamics 1. Internal to a country – the rigidity or 
adjustment of a nuclear program’s policies, 
controls, or bias due to internal, external, or 
international influences, to include the overall 
operating environment. 
2. External to a country – a reflection of the 
interactions between two or more nuclear-
9 This “internal” definition of nuclear stability was provided by the DSRT.  Subsequent analysis by the ANSER 
team and other experts led to the determination that “stability” is best expressed as a feature of the relationship 
between two or more countries while “bias” is a feature of one country’s internal nuclear structure and posture. 
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armed states as well as the influence of the 
internal nuclear biases of those states upon the 
larger, external strategic environment.10  
Policies Nuclear C2 Policy Doctrine that formally dictates and governs 
personnel, authority, equipment, facilities, and 
communications within a nuclear program. 
Negative Procedural C2 
Policy 
Doctrine that dictates and governs varying 
degrees of safety, security and management for 
personnel, authority, communications, and 
strategy to assure there is no unauthorized nuclear 
use. 
Positive Procedural C2 
Policy 
Doctrine that dictates and governs personnel, 
authority, communications, and strategy for the 
rapid execution of authorized launch orders and 
the assurance of nuclear use. 
Negative Technical C2 
Policy 
Doctrine that dictates and governs the varying 
degrees of safety, security and management for 
equipment, facilities, systems, non-human 
elements, and the sharing of technical innovations 
to assure there is no unauthorized nuclear use. 
Positive Technical C2 Policy Doctrine that dictates and governs equipment, 
facilities, systems, non-human elements, and the 
sharing of technical innovations for the rapid 
execution of authorized launch orders and the 
10 See previous note. 
17 
UNCLASSIFIED 
                                                 
 
 
assurance of nuclear use.  
Influences Nuclear C2 Influence A factor that stimulates a change in the balance of 
C2 within a nuclear program resulting in a shift of 
its bias. 
Internal Nuclear C2 
Influence 
An influence that originated from within the 
nuclear program or country using appropriate 
channels (e.g. a policy written, approved, and put 
into action by the nuclear program, etc.) 
External Nuclear C2 
Influence 
An influence that originated from within the 
nuclear program or country using inappropriate 
channels (e.g., a coup forces leaders to alter 
authority or chains of command etc.) 
International C2 Influence An influence that originated from outside the 
country (e.g. a regional crisis, a terrorist act, 
pressure from an international regulatory agency, 
change in the operating environment, etc.)  
Operating Environment Factors that are taken into account for or impact 
the outcome of a nuclear bias/nuclear Stability 
Dynamics (SD)11 that are not controls (e.g. 
geographical locations, lack of technical 
sophistication, internal disagreements etc.) 
Nuclear C2 Elements Subcomponents of C2 infrastructure that support 
11 Conley,  “Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty-First Century: Trends, Disparities and the Impact on 
Stability”, Owen C.W. Price and Jenifer Mackby, Eds., Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues,2007 
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Infrastructure and organize the system (e.g. equipment, 
facilities, strategies, communications, and 
personnel) 
C2 Functions The activities and objectives of C2 infrastructure 
(e.g. force management, force direction, decision 
making, situation monitoring, and planning) 
 
Framework Parameter Gaps 
Throughout the analysis of parameters and subsequent review of reference materials, the Team 
identified several gaps in the 2007 Framework where language was dated, confusing, and/or 
appeared to conflict with other known terms.  It should be noted, however, that the Team did not 
develop any new terminology or concepts while addressing the identified gaps.  Rather, the 
definitions were combined and/or deconstructed in such a way as to clarify and focus already 
recognized and understood language. Specifically, the Team determined: 
 The Framework did not contain formal definitions for several key concepts that should be 
defined in order to provide clarity, such as bias and stability. The Team provided 
proposed language to further refine the definitions for these parameters. 
 Although procedural policies were specifically identified and defined by the Framework, 
technical policies were not. The Team provided proposed language to address the 
technical policy definitional gap. 
 A gap in the Framework concerning how nuclear stability is impacted by C2 bias, and 
specifically what impacts are. The Team identified three (3) influences with the potential 
to impact C2 bias and stability: internal, external, and international. 
 The Framework did not contain a system for categorizing, sorting, or defining C2s 
beyond function.  However, the functions discussed by the Framework were overarching 





define and arrange C2 elements and C2 functions within the Framework (See Figure 3). 
In doing so, the Framework could provide a consistent approach for classifying controls 
and provide language by which to define and differentiate parameters in a more concise 
manner.12 
 
Figure 3. Suggested C2 Elements and Functions13 
 
 In the original Framework, a positive control could cause a nuclear program to be biased 
to use a nuclear weapon or biased to not use a nuclear weapon, given the circumstances 
and complexity of the control.  The Framework cited the example of a submarine 
considered to be a positive control, yet has the characteristics of both use bias and non-
use bias. The Team analyzed this circumstance and determined that the distinction of 
both biased to use and biased to non-use changed the intended definition of a positive 
control. The Team contends that as controls are measures enacted on purpose, the 
employment of a positive control is to ensure the authorized use of nuclear weapons. In 
doing so, a positive control cannot bias a nuclear program against the use of nuclear 
weapons. The Team aligned positive control with bias toward use of nuclear weapons, 
and aligned negative control with bias toward non-use. However, the Team also 
12 Bhushan, “A National Command and Control Network for India in view of Pakistan and China”, 2012. See also 
DoD Nuclear Matters Handbook, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nm_book_5_11/chapter_4.htm.  
13 A separate review of this DSRT-generated table noted that the definition of Force Direction in the Handbook 
encompasses negative and positive as well as technical and procedural controls. In addition, the distinction between 
elements and functions is useful for a more precise understanding of nuclear C2, but it may not be useful to try to 
force the four types of controls into this categorization as it is not a perfect fit and it does not add much to the 
understanding of the controls. 
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determined that a complex control may contain characteristics that are both 
positive and negative. Given this possibility, a complex control (such as a submarine) 
may be divided and considered both negative and positive given the circumstances, or 
based on the operational environment.  
 The term “posture” can be misconstrued as it is used in two (2) separate contexts: in the 
Framework, posture describes a country’s overall bias, but can also be used as a control. 
The Team deconflicted these terms by defining posture as a formal position that describes 
a nuclear program’s weapon response strategy for international awareness and deterrence 
(e.g. no-first use posture, delayed posture, launch on warning posture).  In doing so, a 
program’s posture can be treated as a control because a posture is intended to alert and 
warn international adversaries of intentions and align other controls towards a common 
goal. However, it should be noted that a posture is not a culmination of all controls 
in place, as this is defined as a bias because a nuclear program can say one thing 
(posture) but do something else (bias). In making this distinction, the Framework 
can serve as a possible litmus test to determine if a nuclear program is taking the 
necessary steps and controls to support the posture it claims to have.  
With these concepts defined, the Team then verified the orientation of each within the 
Framework.  Figure 4 represents the core concepts of the Framework regarding the connection 
and relationship which exists between nuclear policies, nuclear C2s, nuclear bias, and nuclear 
SD. 
 








Figure 4a. Revised DSRT Framework Core Concept (based on ANSER Review) 
Due to the fact that the analysis conducted in 2007 to define nuclear C2 structure was new and 
untested in a real world setting, the Framework has the potential to present initial confusion to 
SMEs, particularly SMEs from the international community.  The greatest risk, however, is that 
the complex and novel concepts of the Framework can be misrepresented when compounded 
with non-western-centric viewpoints which may lead to a disregard or rejection of the 
Framework upon initial review.  To reduce this potential confusion, the Team proposed that a 
flow diagram, similar to Figure 4 above, be incorporated into the Framework to support a more 
straightforward understanding of the core concepts and methodology. In doing so, the 
Framework would provide a much simpler method to support constructive dialogue and 
discourse with SMEs. 
Nuclear Command, Control, and Stability Matrix  
The original Framework utilized a four (4) quadrant Matrix (See Figure 5) to represent the 





concepts of the Framework in a flexible, yet constructive format representing the C2, biases and 
stability of a nuclear program.  
 
Figure 5. Rendering of the Original Matrix 
The Team sought to apply the Framework to other analytic constructs, including a Venn 
diagram, to determine if the Framework could be represented in a different, and possibly more 
convincing, manner.  However, the Team did not identify an alternative, more effective way to 
depict the concepts; thus, the proposed four (4) quadrant Matrix was determined to be the most 
suitable representation of the Framework and the core concept flow diagram.  The Team 
therefore used several lessons learned from the identified parameter gaps (e.g. the alignment of 
use bias/non-use bias and positive/negative controls respectively, the use of posture as a control, 
etc.) to update and provide improvements to the Matrix in order to increase clarity and alignment 
with the core concepts.  
The updated Matrix (Figure 6) maintains the four (4) quadrant design with negative/positive 
controls representing the X-axis and procedural/technical controls representing the Y-axis.  
Similar to the original Matrix, the updated Matrix also contains a notional stability point in the 





central point presents a non-bias that theoretically represents nuclear stability.  While analyzing 
the diagram, the Team determined that orienting the negative controls on the left and positive 
controls on the right aligns and supports an basic exposure and understanding of an (X,Y)  
mathematics grid (as negative numbers are always extended to the left, while positive numbers 
extend to the right.  The Team also determined that depicting the bias scale below the four (4) 
quadrants may allow SMEs to better discern and understand the Matrix as it presents a clearer 
understanding of how controls are linked to bias and stability.14 
 
 
Figure 6. Updated Matrix 
14 Conley,  “Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty-First Century: Trends, Disparities and the Impact on 




                                                 
 
 
Nuclear Command, Control, and Stability Matrix Gaps 
Although the Team chose to maintain the four (4) quadrant Matrix design, there are several key 
differences and modifications to be made based on the findings uncovered during the parameter 
gap analysis to include:  
 The submarine15 use/non-use bias quadrant unnecessarily overcomplicated the 
Framework and should be broken apart to allow greater flexibility for all controls.  Based 
on this, the Team decided to clearly define negative controls as being non-use biased and 
positive controls as being use biased. However, if the negative characteristics of a 
positive control (and vice versa) are significant enough to effect bias, they should be 
listed separately in whichever quadrant they represent.16  This solution allows for greater 
clarity in deciphering the Matrix.  For example, as the submarine is generally considered 
a positive control with negative characteristics, both the positive and negative 
characteristics of a submarine should be listed separately as positive and negative 
controls to allow a more complete understanding of the controls a nuclear program has 
put in place.  
 The addition of a use/non-use bias scale to represent the predisposition of a nuclear 
program was necessary because the original Matrix appeared to display biases as an 
either-or construct.  The Team discouraged this visual cue due in part to the fact that 
biases can have both negative/positive characteristics and technical/procedural 
characteristics.  
 The original Framework lacked an identifiable formal representation of stability 
dynamics to influence a program’s bias and controls.  To connect stability dynamics to 
the visual, the Team portrayed stability dynamics on the Matrix as an arrow pulling the 
15 It is understood, however, that the capabilities and roles of submarines varies significantly among the various 
states possessing nuclear weapons as well as how launch authorizations are designated for those platforms. 
16 The splitting of the bottom-right quadrant in the original 2007 Framework served a secondary purpose, however. 
The Framework argues that a C2 system that has controls in the left two quadrants as well as the bottom-right 
quadrant is good/stable, while those in the top-right (reliant on Positive Procedural Controls) are more unstable. 
There is potentially merit in having two matrices – one that is blank for evaluating a country’s C2, and another with 
green and red for depicting the author’s argument that certain areas of the matrix are more “stable.” 
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bias in a specific direction.  Examples of destabilizing influences on a nuclear program’s 
bias include: internal, external, international, political, policies, crises, and innovation.   
 The original Framework listed only controls and postures on the Matrix to consider bias 
and stability. However, factors from the operational environment may also play a 
significant role in the bias or influence of a nuclear program. Therefore, the Team 
suggests that a legend be incorporated into the Matrix to differentiate controls and 
environmental factors to ensure that both can be accurately analyzed on the Matrix.  For 
example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets in Cuba had limited 
communication with Moscow. This lack of communication was not a control, rather a 
factor of the operating environment.17  Given this situation played a major role in the 
Soviets nuclear C2 structure at the time, lack of hardened communication would be listed 
on the Matrix as a factor of the operational environment, and not necessarily as a 
control.18 
 The quantitative nature of the Matrix may lead to qualitative errors in determining biases. 
For example, if an audience does not understand the value of one control over another, 
the quantity of controls visually represented in the Matrix may mislead an audience to 
disagree with the bias if specific controls carry more weight than other controls. 
Moreover, if a nuclear program contains fewer, yet more impactful negative controls than 
positive controls, the bias will be viewed toward non-use.  However, when depicted on 
the Matrix, the negative controls appear to be fewer than positive controls; the audience 
may disagree with a non-use bias and the Matrix could lose credibility.  Ultimately the 
value of the framework may be that it allows experts to have a meaningful discussion 
about C2 and the potential for bias.  SMEs may disagree about where the bias falls on the 
matrix (there is no “right” answer), but they can use the framework to express their 
disagreements using the same lexicon.  To address this issue, the Team evaluated several 
mitigation strategies: 
17 A counter-point is that this was a characteristic of the technical measures or controls in place at the time. 
18 This recommendation is included in order to preserve the original recommendations from the DSRT, but follow-
on reviews by several experts all agree that hardened communications are an aspect of technical control measures 
and should therefore be treated as such. 
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1. Gauge the qualitative weight of common controls and visually incorporate quality 
into the size/color on the Matrix or incorporate qualitative weight into the bias 
scale on the Matrix. 
i. Benefit: Matrix would be more accurate and conclusive. 
ii. Drawback: Matrix would be more complicated, visually confusing, and 
subject to opinion. 
2. Gauge the qualitative weight of common controls and eliminate low value 
controls that are not significant. 
i. Benefit: Matrix would be simpler and easy to read. 
ii. Drawback: Matrix would be less accurate and more subjective. 
3. Do not incorporate quality into the Matrix and allow the Matrix to be quantitative 
only. 
i. Benefit: Matrix would be simpler and easier to read. 
ii. Drawback: Matrix may be misleading. 
The Team chose to employ the second mitigation strategy because it eliminates non-impactful 
controls,19 which allows for simplicity when critical analysis and thought regarding the 
Framework is applied by SMEs.  Given the simplicity of the core concept, technical SMEs may 
become frustrated with the lack of detail.  However, to support a wide range of SME 
backgrounds (technical experts, politicians, policy makers, etc.) simplicity is important to 
support bilateral communication.  
Application 
To properly assess the Framework and identify points of confusion in the Matrix, the Team 
applied the Matrix using two (2) case studies.  The chosen case studies were designed to test the 
Framework’s concepts in an historical context.  Additionally, the Team used the completed 
Matrices from these tests to inspect, identify, and correct sources of visual confusion to prevent 
19 A risk with this approach is that controls will have different significance in different operating environments 
(accident, theft, forward deployment, etc). 
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future SME misunderstandings while using the Matrix.  To test the Framework, the Team first 
applied the updated Framework and Matrix to several common nuclear C2 structures discussed 
by “A National Command and Control Network for India in view of Pakistan and China” to 
assess if the Matrix would consistently evaluate a wide spectrum of possible controls and 
biases.20  Second, the Team applied the Matrix to historical events to determine if the biases and 
stability dynamics forecasted by the Matrix mirrored real world scenarios.  Using each case 
study, the Team determined that the outcomes forecasted by the Matrix mirrored conventional 
analyses and identified potential sources of confusion.  The following sections discuss and detail 
each case study, to include: 
1. Nuclear C2 structures 
 Common Nuclear C2 structures 
 Nuclear Control Trends 
2. Historical Controls, Bias, and Stability Depiction  
 Cuban Missile Crisis: Soviet’s in Cuba  
 Indian Parliament Attack -2001: India’s Nuclear Program 
Nuclear C2 Structure Case Study 
The initial case study assessed the Matrix by mapping common nuclear C2 structures to 
determine if the Matrix could accommodate a wide spectrum of controls and biases. These 
common C2 structures (Table 2) vary by economic, technological and governmental factors:21 
 
Table 2. Common C2 structures22 
20 Bhushan”, A National Command and Control Network for India in view of Pakistan and China”, 2012, 
http://frontierindia.net/a-national-command-and-control-network-for-india-in-view-of-pakistan-and-china 
21 Bhushan”, A National Command and Control Network for India in view of Pakistan and China”, 2012, 
http://frontierindia.net/a-national-command-and-control-network-for-india-in-view-of-pakistan-and-china 
22 Ibid.  Of note, follow-on reviewers of this DSRT assessment argued that these are not all NC2 structures since 
NC2 structures can be Civil and/or Military and centralized or decentralized with attributes that make it simple, 
complex, wealthy or poor.  These categories may encourage generic stereotypes rather than in-depth analysis of real 
countries.  The use of “wealthy” or “poor” may not be adequate descriptions of NC2 structures as they describe a 
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Wealthy A nuclear program that has economic resources to research, expand, 
and bolster itself with both experienced people and technical 
innovations. 
Poor A nuclear program that does not have sufficient economic resources 
to properly research, expand, and bolster itself and relies on 
procedures instead of technology and experience. 
Complex A nuclear program that has the material resources and personnel to 
support a wide range of controls and redundancies. 
Simple A nuclear program that has minimal material resources or personnel 
to adequately support a robust and redundant C2 structure. 
Centralized A nuclear program that maintains authority and control of its nuclear 
armament as a singular capability through a defined chain of 
command. 
Decentralized A nuclear program that distributes authority of its nuclear armament 
to a network of commanders or individuals who operate as 
independent decision makers with minimal oversight. 
Civilian A nuclear program that is governed by an elected, non-military 
government that maintains authority and control over the nuclear 
arsenal through a defined chain of authority. 
Military A nuclear program that is governed by a weak civilian government 
and/or the military maintains control and authority over the nuclear 
arsenal. 
country’s economy, not its C2 structure. The resources a nation devotes to its nuclear capability are not always 
proportional to other resource allocations, but alone may be indicative of a nations bias towards use or non-use. 
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For each nuclear C2 structure, the Team identified and categorized controls listed by Bhushan in 
“A National Command and Control Network for India in view of Pakistan and China” on a 
Matrix according to the proposed definitions of each control to determine bias.  The Team 
compared the biases of each nuclear C2 structure on a single Matrix (Figure 7) to analyze the 
trends of financial resources (wealthy/poor), innovation (complex/simple), authority 
(centralized/de-centralized) and form of governing body (civilian/military).  The trends portrayed 
by this common nuclear C2 Matrix are discussed by other references, but not in the same 
manner. This Matrix provides a visual point of discussion to support its findings and 
determinations in a way that was not found by any other reference. The Team concluded that this 







Figure 7. Common C2 Structures23 
For each nuclear C2 structure, the Team categorized the controls listed by Bhushan on an 
individual Matrix according to their proposed definitions.  Below, Figures 8-15 illustrate each 
individual Matrix of common nuclear C2 structures with the controls which impact and/or dictate 
bias.  
 
Figure 8. Wealthy C2 Structure24 
23 An independent critique of this revised Framework questioned whether it is possible to fit these categories into the 
Matrix as the categories are too generic to say that they are biased in one way or another (some categories may be 
more clearly biased to technical or procedural, but harder to determine use/non-use based on these categories).  It is 
also unclear where the controls listed in each quadrant come from and how it’s possible to say that a 
wealthy/centralized/military program has a certain control.  It may therefore make more sense to just look at each 
country individually (there are only nine) than to try to generalize these eight categories. 
24 It is understood that the term “wealthy” may place too much emphasis on the geo-political debate over “the haves 
& have-nots” within nuclear security discussions.  Moreover, some reviewers observed that many of the “controls” 
listed on the matrix (e.g. economic share, regional influence, large arsenal) have nothing to do with C2 since a 
control is something that is put in place, not a feature of the country. 
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Figure 9. Poor C2 Structure 
 












Figure 12. Centralized C2 Structure 
 






Figure 14. Civilian C2 Structure 
 





Historical Controls, Bias and Stability 
The second case study focused on applying the Matrix to historical nuclear events to assess the 
utility and applicability of the Framework.  In the original 2007 analysis, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis was used as an example of how to apply the outlined approach.  The Team also selected 
this event as a case study as it has been well-researched and debated within the C2 community of 
interest, providing ample resources to draw information from. The Team also selected a more 
recent nuclear confrontation, the India/Pakistan Stand-Off of 2001, in order to apply the 
Framework to a more modern and less conclusive historical event. The Team reviewed the 
Cuban Missile Crisis example provided by the original Framework and employed a similar 
rationale to the case studies as proofs of concept that the updated Framework and Matrix could 
be used to represent modern nuclear confrontations.  
The Cuban Missile Crisis unraveled as a rapid rise in nuclear tensions between the Soviet Union 
and the United States.  Both powers had the ability to deploy nuclear weapons but throughout the 
engagement, negative controls and “cooler heads” prevailed as no nuclear exchange occurred. 
The Soviet nuclear arsenal, though outmatched, was strategically placed to strike the United 
States’ southeastern coast, yet the controls and bias of the Soviet’s nuclear program kept its 
arsenal in check.25  By placing the significant controls and environmental factors within the 
corresponding quadrants on the Matrix, the Team determined that the Soviet’s bias toward non-
use was easy to visualize and discuss.  
However, the Team questioned if a non-use bias mirrored the historical events of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. Whereas the United States was not aware of the controls in place or the 
environment by which the Soviets were operating, the United States was able to successfully 
blockade Cuba and force the Soviets to withdraw their nuclear armament.  It stands to reason, 
that the Soviet’s non-use bias and non-bias toward either procedural or technical controls, 





                                                 
 
 
allowed the Soviets to maintain their chain of authority, while also maintaining their ability to 
rapidly respond, if necessary.  Figure 16 depicts the C2 and bias of the Soviets in Cuba scenario. 
 
Figure 16. Soviets in Cuba C2 Structure26 
To further test the application and concepts of the Framework, the Team mirrored this process 
for a more recent nuclear crisis, the India/Pakistan Stand-Off of 2001.  To avoid debated 
material, the Team focused its research on confirmed and widely accepted controls and 
circumstances to populate the Matrix, and to plot the bias of the Indian nuclear program 
throughout the Stand-Off.  The Stand-Off occurred as a response to an attack on the Indian 
Parliament by a terrorist organization suspected of being harbored and funded by the Pakistani 
26 Secondary reviewers observed that the original framework had “notional balance of control measures” instead of 
“notional stability point” in the middle of the matrix. The former seems more accurate, but even that may be 
unnecessary to include because the original Framework did not argue that being in the center of the matrix is 
better/more stable.  For this case study, there was a bifurcation of Soviet authority in Cuba – one controlled missiles 
while the other controlled the warhead storage access.  In addition, Soviet submarines at the time had nuclear 
torpedoes rather than missiles. 
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intelligence services.  India quickly assembled its conventional army and made threats to cross 
into Pakistan in an effort to bring justice to the terrorist organizations.  Vastly outmatched by 
India’s conventional forces and wearing thin because of the United States presence in 
Afghanistan, the Government of Pakistan said it would protect its sovereignty and promised a 
swift retaliation of any and all weapons if they were attacked by India.27  Pre-conflict, India’s 
arsenal was superior to Pakistan’s in both quantity and quality. Though not publicized, India’s 
civilian control was performing due diligence to maintain both procedural and technical controls 
to balance the nuclear program as it expanded.28  However, as the Stand-Off worsened and 
tensions rose, the Indian nuclear arsenal was put on alert and though the weapons were not 
reported to be mated with delivery vehicles or ready to launch, the warheads were to a certain 
degree assembled to enable a response by eliminating several technical controls, thus changing 
the posture of its nuclear arsenal.  Based on these events, the Matrix, as depicted in Figure 17, 
illustrates that India shifted its nuclear program to rely on procedural controls, thus potentially 
shifting its bias against the use of nuclear weapons to a more biased position. The Matrix further 
shows that Indian bias shifted to potentially rely more on procedural policies during the conflict. 
Many experts have espoused a belief that it was Pakistan’s assured response that deterred India 
from taking the final steps of conventional warfare.  However, India’s negative controls allowed 
its nuclear arsenal to remain temperate throughout the Stand-Off, demonstrating that a shifting 
bias is not an intention or preference to use nuclear weapons but rather an indication of changing 
internal dynamics which could eventually impact the use of nuclear capabilities.  This example 
also represents how the Matrix can be used to determine a shift in a nuclear program’s bias in 
response to an international influence.  
27 Coll, “The Stand-Off: How Jihadi Groups Helped Provoke the Twenty-First Century’s First Nuclear Crisis”, The 
New Yorker, 2006; Clary, “Command and Control Trends and Choices for the Next Decade in South Asia”, Nuclear 
Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia; The Naval Post Graduate School , 2012; Stolar, “To The Brink: Indian 
Decision-Making and the 2001-2001 Standoff”, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008 
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/To_the_Brink.pdf 
28 Coll, “The Stand-Off: How Jihadi Groups Helped Provoke the Twenty-First Century’s First Nuclear Crisis”, The 
New Yorker, 2006 
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Figure 17. India/Pakistan Standoff: Indian C2 Structure29 
The second case study demonstrates that the potential for a nuclear war is a strong motivator to 
adjust a program’s bias.  It stands to reason, however, that similar adjustments can be made using 
international pressure or other motivating factors. As such, the Team recommends that the 
Matrix and Framework be applied to circumstances that represent historical events where 
political or regional pressure was used to shift or alter a nuclear program’s bias. The Matrix 
could thus serve as a beneficial tool to a politician or policy maker to better assist them in 
recognizing and understanding the contributing factors and complexity related to a nuclear C2 
structure. 
From these case studies, the Team concluded that the Matrix is a useful structure by which to 
visualize and discuss issues relating to the stability dynamics and bias shifts of nuclear countries 
29 Secondary reviewers of this case study matrix have observed that the combination of Operating Environment 
factors with C2 controls results in some confusion over the C2 factors which influence the shift in bias. For example, 
“weapons were not diverse” is a feature of the nuclear arsenal but not the C2 structure. “Recall of diplomats” is a 
political action that affects the political environment but is not related to nuclear C2.   
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from an analytical standpoint.  Moreover, the Team assesses that factors from the operational 
environment, though very important, will be a source of conflict regarding how bias may be 
impacted. This challenge is somewhat predicated upon the qualitative/quantitative problem 
discussed previously, as some SMEs may consider certain factors or controls as more important 
than others. However, the Team recommends that a visualization which incorporates both 
qualitative and quantitative controls may be best to promote rigorous, yet constructive discourse. 
Conclusion 
The VT-ARC DSRT was unable to identify a comparable, competing Framework for 
understanding nuclear stability based on C2 controls and procedures. To ensure the 
conceptualization of C2 would be useful to the community of interest, the Team verified and 
amended the existing Framework to accurately reflect real world outcomes of C2 policies.  The 
limitation, though, is that individuals may have differing opinions regarding where a control 
should be placed on the Matrix.  Even more so, the Team assessed that factors from the 
operational environment, though very important, may be a source of conflict regarding how the 
impact of a bias is understood. This challenge may be further complicated, based on the 
qualitative/quantitative difficulties identified previously, as some experts may consider certain 
factors or controls to be more important than others.  A recommended solution to this challenge 
is to reduce the number of controls placed on the Matrix in order to reduce the quantitative 
nature of the Matrix while increasing the qualitative aspect of each control.  However, the Team 
proposes that a mix of both qualitative and quantitative control visualization(s) may be most 
appropriate to promote healthy and constructive discourse.  
Ultimately, the Team determined that the original C2 Framework proposed in 2007 presented a 
new approach to nuclear bias and stability that could not be found in other readily available 
sources.  Though the Framework highlights new ideas and concepts regarding the controls and 
stability of a nuclear program, the findings of this Assessment strongly suggest that the concepts 
of the Framework are sound from an analytic point of view. However, real world use and 





Team has provided a proposed update to the Framework and Matrix which is designed to reduce 
confusion, while presenting the material in as consistent manner as can be vis-a-vis nuclear 
stability dynamics. To further assess and mitigate possible gaps in real world application, the 
Team used the updated Matrix—applying it to several case studies of historical events—to 








Annex A: ANSER Assessment & Alternate Framework 
As a secondary tasking, the ANSER team was asked to explore an alternative framework which 
might provide policy makers with a methodology to analyze and compare Nuclear Command 
and Control systems and assist in determining a nuclear weapon capable country’s nuclear bias 
and overall stability metrics between two or more nuclear-capable countries.  This tasking 
evolved as a result of the preliminary analysis which found that the 2007 Framework was overly 
simplistic and general in trying to express all C2 factors impacting all nuclear capable states, and 
given the relative small number of nuclear capable states, that a deeper assessment was prudent 
for each state.  The team therefore generated an outline of a framework that has the potential to 
provide an in-depth analysis of a country’s nuclear command and control apparatus.  This 
analysis in turn may assist policy makers with data and metrics to evaluate a country’s bias 
towards use or no-use of nuclear weapon employment. 
Study Plan 
To accomplish this task, a two-phased approach was used.  Phase I defines the DOTMLPF-P 
aspects of a nuclear weapons capable nation.  Phase II applies theses aspects to the nine nuclear 
weapon capable nations to come up with an assessment of that nation’s Nuclear C2 and how it’s 
positive and negative controls might determine a bias towards use or non-use of nuclear 
weapons.  A comprehensive use of this framework potentially requires access to classified 
information and also requires subject matter expertise in a particular country’s Nuclear Weapons 
command and control system in order to apply the DOTMLPF-P aspects. 
Methodology 
In order to provide a common assessment framework to ensure consistency and compatibility, 
the team recommends utilizing the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, 
Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) methodology used by the DoD in it requirements 
generation process. For the purpose of this effort the DOTMLPF-P definitions should be 





This task uses Doctrine as an example of how a DOTMLPF-P analysis might be applied by 
examining positive and negative controls in a Nuclear C2 system and supporting a determination 
of bias toward use or no-use of nuclear weapons. 
(Excerpt from “Nuclear Command and Control in the Twenty First Century: Trends, Disparities 
and the Impact on Stability”, Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues, 2007). A core challenge in 
the design and development of a C2 system is the need to strike a balance between having a 
process that ensures nuclear weapons are always employed when proper authorization is 
provided, and ensuring they are never employed (or detonated) in the absence of proper 
authorization. From a system design perspective, this “always-never” challenge is addressed 
through the development of positive controls (measures that ensure nuclear employment when 
properly authorized) and negative controls (measures that prevent accidental or unauthorized 
nuclear employment). In mature C2 systems, these positive and negative controls are applied in 
a layered and redundant manner in order to achieve six primary functions: 
1. Maintain the technical conditions and combat readiness of the strategic systems; 
2. Prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; 
3. Facilitate routine operations among staff and subordinate forces; 
4. Provide inter-service and interagency coordination on all aspects of the nuclear mission, to 
include ballistic missile defense, early warning, reconnaissance, etc; 
5. Develop and update nuclear war plans; and 
6. Enable the combat use of nuclear weapons. 
Two general approaches are applied when developing the negative and positive controls 
necessary for achieving these six functions: the use of procedural and technical measures. 
Procedural Approaches to Negative and Positive Controls 
Procedurally, operational plans, doctrine, and training can dictate varying degrees of safety, 
security, and reliability as the strategic forces transition from a peacetime posture through a 
crisis, and toward employment. Procedural measures in support of negative controls can 
include: the use of a two-person rule that makes it impossible for a single person to initiate a 
launch; the separation of special nuclear material (SNM) from the high-explosive assembly of a 
warhead; the separation of a warhead from its delivery vehicle; or restricting access to launch 
codes. In addition, a strategic doctrine that espouses no-first use (NFU) or delayed retaliation 
posture can be considered a negative control. These postures seek to provide a cushion of time 
for strategic decision-makers who may be subject to stress and “the fog of war” during a crisis 
and potentially face the unintended use of nuclear weapons due to the inadvertent escalation of a 
crisis. In this context, nuclear use is authorized by the appropriate command authority, but 
“unauthorized” in the context of inaccurate and incomplete knowledge or not meeting the 
original, pre-crisis intent of the strategic authority. 
 





A broad array of technical measures for providing negative and positive controls have been 
developed and fielded over the past sixty years, though the availability and use of these measures 
vary among the spectrum of nuclear nations. Technical measures include “one-point safety” 
designs for weapons that ensure the accidental detonation of a weapon’s high-explosive 
assembly does not provide an adequate impulse for detonation of the nuclear core. Other 
negative controls include mechanical and electronic locks (to include Permissive Acton Links - 
PALs), fail safe designs, weak links, electric exclusion zones, and other technical measures that 
prevent unauthorized or accidental use. Technical measures that provide positive nuclear 
controls include hardened communications systems, frequency diversity, mobile command posts, 
interference resistant communications, and environmental sensing devices for warhead arming. 
 
DOTMLPF-P Framework. The framework is not all-inclusive and may require further analysis 
to expand nuclear C2 procedural and technical control measures. The Doctrine example below 
(Figure 1) is illustrative in nature and would be applied across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum. Upon 
completion of each DOTMLPF-P section, an overall score would determine a bias towards use 
or no-use of nuclear weapons (Figure 2).  Aspects of procedural and technical controls should be 







Purpose: To map out some of the key doctrine aspects that could be considered in an 
organization’s nuclear C2 system. 
Description: The development of doctrine is a process that continues throughout the growth of 
an organization.  As new polices and circumstances develop, so will the need for appropriate 
doctrine.  The goal of this section is to develop foundations for analysis of nuclear C2 procedural 
measures by examining the negative and positive controls employed. 
Definition: Doctrine is the fundamental principle that guides the operations and functions of the 
organization toward common goals and objectives.  Doctrine includes documents that formalize 
the organization’s strategy, policy, and procedures to codify authority, roles and responsibilities. 
Doctrine provides the strategic context and linkage between the top levels of the organization 
and the tactics, techniques, and procedures required at the operational levels. 
In general, doctrinal aspects of a nuclear C2 system are primarily procedural in nature and 
classified as either negative or positive controls.  Listed below are terms unique to this doctrine 
section: 
Negative Controls 
• Delayed retaliation posture 
• No-first use or Launch on Warning 
• Two-person rule 
• Restricted access to launch codes 
• Separation of warhead components 




• Airborne alert status 
• Launch on Warning (LOW) posture 
• Strip alert for strategic bombers 
• Pre-delegation of launch authority 
• Final assembly of warhead 






Summary: Doctrine outlines the C2 system’s behavior and establishes a means of achieving its 
goals and objectives. Evaluating doctrine is critical in determining whether a nuclear C2 system 
may be biased toward use or non-use. Specifically, the nuclear doctrine prescribes the strategic 
context, authorities, roles and responsibilities, and limitations that govern how the C2 system 






Doctrine Section (example) 
Figure 1 
Section Weight Procedural Aspect Control Weight 
Doctrine 2  (-) Y/N  
  Delayed retaliation posture Y 3 
  No-first use or Launch on Warning Y 2 
  Two-person rule N 1 
  Restricted access to launch codes Y 1 
  Separation of warhead components N 2 
  Separation of warheads & vehicles Y 3 
  Other  TBD 
Non-Use   Total 9 
     
   (+) Y/N  
  Airborne alert status N 1 
  Launch on Warning (LOW) posture Y 2 
  Strip alert for strategic bombers Y 3 
  Pre-delegation of launch authority N 1 









Other: additional aspects as required/needed such as survivability 
 
  
  Mating warhead with delivery vehicle N 3 
  Other  TBD 









DOTMLPF/BIAS USE NEUTRAL NON-USE 
Doctrine   2 
Organization    
Training    
Materiel    
Leadership    
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Facilities    
Policy    
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Nuclear commaNd aNd coNtrol  
iN the tweNty-First ceNtury
treNds, disparities aNd the impact oN stability
Jerome M. Conley
With the turn of the twenty-first century a renewed interest has arrived in the role of nuclear weapons as symbols of national power as well as tools for strategic posturing. The 1998 nu-
clear tests in South Asia, the 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 
the British debate over Trident replacement, and the overt pursuit of 
nuclear capabilities by Iran and North Korea represent key examples of 
an overall shift in the number of states with nuclear capabilities, nuclear 
aspirations, and legacy systems that require modernization. However, 
the 2001 attacks on the United States with airplanes and anthrax un-
derscore a changing security environment in which asymmetric risks 
created by non-state actors may alter and/or diminish the degree of se-
curity afforded by nuclear deterrence.
As discussed in the previous chapters, these multifarious factors con-
verge to provide a rich forum for assessing the future utility of nuclear 
weapons and the transformation of nuclear deterrence. These assess-
ments and projections, however, focus almost exclusively on the quan-
tity and quality of warheads and delivery systems and seldom broach 
the equally critical topic of the command and control (C2) systems that 
define nuclear operations. As the design and robustness of C2 systems 
impact the safety, security and reliability of nuclear weapons during 
peacetime, crises, and wartime, an adequate and balanced assessment of 
nuclear deterrence and stability in the twenty-first century must simul-
taneously explore the quantity and quality of nuclear weapon systems as 
well as the systems and processes that control them. In an era when the 
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true strategic intentions of existing and aspiring nuclear nations grow 
more opaque, an analysis of the command and control trends within 
these states can serve to clarify the role of nuclear weapons for these 
actors.
Key aspects oF Nuclear commaNd aNd coNtrol
This chapter explores the technical and procedural aspects of nuclear 
safety, security, and reliability, the ongoing changes in global and re-
gional security dynamics, and the implications of these factors on nucle-
ar deterrence and stability in the twenty-first century. Overall, nuclear 
command and control1 involves the designation of select personnel who 
have the authority to determine the disposition and employment of nu-
clear weapons; it also involves the creation of systems and processes to 
ensure the intentions and decisions of these authorities are properly ex-
ecuted. The U.S. Department of Defense defines nuclear command and 
control as:
The exercise of authority and direction by the President, as Com-
mander in Chief, through established command lines, over nuclear 
weapon operations of military forces; as Chief Executive over all 
Government activities that support those operations; and, as Head 
of State over required multinational actions that support those op-
erations. The [nuclear command and control] structure supports the 
exercise of authority and direction by the President.2
The means through which this presidential authority is executed is 
the nuclear command and control system and includes the “combina-
tion of facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and person-
nel essential for planning, directing, and controlling nuclear weapons, 
weapons systems, and associated operations.”3 Though the names and 
authorities may vary, all C2 programs involve the same attributes of a 
human decisionmaker(s) and the employment of technical and proce-
dural control measures to ensure the safe, secure, and reliable execu-
tion of these decisions. Where differences occur, however, are in the 
types of control measures emphasized by these actors and the ability of 
their command and control systems to ensure consistent and balanced 
safety, security and reliability during times of peace, crisis, and hostility 
(nuclear or otherwise).
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the “always-Never” challenge and the role of  
positive and Negative controls
A core challenge in the design and development of a C2system is the 
need to strike a balance between having a process that ensures nuclear 
weapons are always employed when proper authorization is provided, 
and ensuring they are never employed (or detonated) in the absence 
of proper authorization. From a system design perspective, this “al-
ways-never” challenge is addressed through the development of posi-
tive controls (measures that ensure nuclear employment when properly 
authorized) and negative controls (measures that prevent accidental or 
unauthorized nuclear employment).4 In mature C2 systems, these posi-
tive and negative controls are applied in a layered and redundant man-
ner in order to achieve six primary functions:
1. Maintain the technical conditions and combat readiness of the strate-
gic systems;
2. Prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
3. Facilitate routine operations among staff and subordinate forces;
4. Provide inter-service and interagency coordination on all aspects of 
the nuclear mission, to include ballistic missile defense, early warning, 
reconnaissance, etc.;
5. Develop and update nuclear war plans; and
6. Enable the combat use of nuclear weapons.5
As detailed below in Figure 12.1, two general approaches are applied 
when developing the negative and positive controls necessary for achiev-
ing these six functions: the use of procedural and technical measures.
procedural approaches to Negative and positive controls
Procedurally, operational plans, doctrine, and training can dictate vary-
ing degrees of safety, security, and reliability as the strategic forces transi-
tion from a peacetime posture through a crisis, and toward employment. 
Procedural measures in support of negative controls can include:  the 
use of a two-person rule that makes it impossible for a single person to 
initiate a launch; the separation of special nuclear material (SNM) from 
the high-explosive assembly of a warhead; the separation of a warhead 
from its delivery vehicle; or restricting access to launch codes. In addi-
tion, a strategic doctrine that espouses no-first use (NFU) or delayed 
retaliation posture can be considered a negative control.  These postures 
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seek to provide a cushion of time for strategic decision-makers who may 
be subject to stress and “the fog of war” during a crisis and potentially 
face the unintended use of nuclear weapons due to the inadvertent es-
calation of a crisis.6 In this context, nuclear use is authorized by the 
appropriate command authority, but “unauthorized” in the context of 
inaccurate and incomplete knowledge or not meeting the original, pre-
crisis intent of the strategic authority.
Figure 12.1. procedural and technical approaches to Negative and 
positive controls
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Examples of procedural measures that promote positive control over 
nuclear forces include the delegation of launch authority to subordinate 
or field commanders, the final assembly of warhead components, the 
mating of warheads with their delivery vehicles, the initiation of air-
borne alert status for bombers and the deployment of mobile missile 
forces. These measures provide for the rapid execution of authorized 
launch orders and an assurance of nuclear use. From a doctrinal per-
spective, a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture (sometimes referred to 
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as a “hair-trigger” posture) can also provide rapid and assured nuclear 
use.7 
technical approaches to Negative and positive controls
A broad array of technical measures for providing negative and posi-
tive controls have been developed and fielded over the past sixty years, 
though the availability and use of these measures vary among the spec-
trum of nuclear nations. Technical measures include “one-point safety” 
designs for weapons that ensure the accidental detonation of a weapon’s 
high-explosive assembly does not provide an adequate impulse for deto-
nation of the nuclear core. Other negative controls include mechanical 
and electronic locks (to include Permissive Acton Links - PALs), fail safe 
designs, weak links, electric exclusion zones, and other technical mea-
sures that prevent unauthorized or accidental use. Technical measures 
that provide positive nuclear controls include hardened communica-
tions systems, frequency diversity, mobile command posts, interference 
resistant communications, and environmental sensing devices for war-
head arming.8 An additional technical positive control measure is a ful-
ly automatic launch system, such as the Dead Hand (“Mertvaya Ruka”) 
system explored but never deployed by the Soviet Union.9 This type of 
automatic system, however, may be considered destabilizing as it re-
moves the human decisionmaker from the response cycle and does not 
allow for a strategic pause if de-escalation is desired.
General impressions on strategic stability and Negative  
and positive controls 
Figure 2 provides a summary graphic of the general implications and 
trends associated with the procedural and technical measures of nega-
tive and positive control. As this overall analysis centers on the role of 
command and control within strategic stability, it is important to note 
that certain C2 trends may bias a system toward use, but this bias does 
not predetermine actual use. From a strategic stability perspective, the 
maintenance of negative controls during peacetime, crisis, and conflict 
ensures that nuclear assets are only employed when properly authorized 
by the designated authority(s). In many cases, however, the procedural 
aspects of negative controls rely on the proper and disciplined execution 
of these measures by people within the command and control system. 
For this reason, Personnel Reliability Programs (PRPs)10 are critical in 
established as well as emerging nuclear programs.
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Figure 2 also underscores the critical procedural transition that 
can occur during a crisis when the negative control measures of hav-
ing warheads disassembled and unmated with delivery vehicles change 
to positive control measures of fully assembled warheads being mated 
to delivery vehicles and deployed to the field. This “either-or” aspect of 
negative/positive controls poses significant risk for countries lacking 
mature technical negative controls as the decision to cross into positive 
procedural controls eliminates the primary negative controls provided 
by weapon disassembly.11 
Figure 12. 2. balancing the “always-Never” challenge
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The role of technical approaches to negative and positive controls is 
perhaps the most significant and destabilizing aspect of C2 disparity in 
the twenty-first century as new and emerging nuclear custodians rely 
heavily on procedural measures due to their limited expertise and finan-
cial resources for developing robust technological measures. Moreover, 
unlike positive procedural controls that foster a bias toward use, most 
positive technical controls (with the exception of fully automated launch 
Notional balance 
of control  
measures
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systems) foster a bias toward non-use during crises.  This is because the 
robustness and assurances provided by these technologies can allow ad-
equate guarantees against the complete loss of nuclear forces and/or C2 
in the case of an adversary’s first strike. In this respect, a balanced mix of 
positive technical controls and negative controls (both procedural and 
technical) and the limitation/avoidance of positive procedural controls 
can provide a sufficiently robust C2 system to ensure a safe, secure, and 
reliable nuclear arsenal. Stated differently, the promotion of a C2 posture 
that continuously maintains positive and negative controls within the 
left side and bottom right portion of Figure 2 will meet the requirements 
of the “always-never” challenge for a nuclear custodian while simultane-
ously assuring a credible deterrent to potential adversaries.
cuba 1962: historical example of the role of c2  
within the “always-Never” challenge
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 is the most cited case of the 
potential risks created when two nuclear nations enter into a crisis. 
Analysis of the Soviet records of this event show that heavy reliance on 
negative controls (primarily procedural) provided a sufficient C2 bias 
toward non-use that the actual approach toward the nuclear brink was 
perhaps less precipitous than often cited. Central to this assertion is the 
fact that General Issa Pliyev, commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, did 
not have full authority to employ nuclear forces.  In addition, procedural 
safeguards were enacted to ensure that the nuclear weapons on the is-
land were stored separately from their delivery vehicles and required 
authorization directly from Moscow (instead of General Pliyev) to re-
move them from storage.12 Figure 3 captures the resultant non-use bias 
created by these procedural negative controls.
As stated above, however, heavy reliance on procedural measures 
during a crisis places significant emphasis on the personnel within the 
C2 structure and their ability (and willingness) to execute the orders of 
the national command authority. During the Cuban crisis, General Pli-
yev made repeated requests to Moscow to remove the warheads for the 
medium-range Frog missiles from storage. Though these requests were 
all denied, as commander of all Soviet forces on the island, he could the-
oretically have forced the officer in charge of the nuclear storage site to 
release the weapons to him, at which point General Pliyev had the tech-
nical capability to launch the nuclear-armed missiles without final au-
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thorization from Moscow. Due to the strict Soviet command structure, 
General Pliyev did not violate his orders from Moscow and the nega-
tive procedural controls remained intact. This potential loss of negative 
controls unnerved the Soviet leadership and as Mark Kramer recently 
observed, “After the Cuban missile crisis, however, the option of relying 
solely on the physical separation of warheads and delivery vehicles was 
deemed inadequate.”13 
Figure 12. 3: cuba, 1962: historical example of c2 system  
bias toward Non-use
tweNty-First ceNtury Nuclear actors  
aNd their c2 postures
Given the previous discussion on the key concepts and aspects of nega-
tive and positive controls, it is appropriate to explore these issues with-
in the context of the international actors that currently possess or are 
pursuing nuclear capabilities. Though certain limitations exist on the 
availability and quality of open source data for some actors, sufficient 
information exists to identify trends and potential biases within their 
C2 postures.
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the p5 Nations 
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are 
all custodians of legacy nuclear capabilities and their associated com-
mand and control systems. In the sixteen years since the end of the Cold 
War, each nation has explored the future structure and posture of their 
strategic arsenals in the context of the changing global security environ-
ment.14 
The specific design and construct of the Chinese nuclear command 
and control system is believed to be based on an assertive, centralized 
command structure with the Chairman of the Central Military Com-
mission, currently President Jiang Zemin, as the national authority for 
nuclear use. For negative controls, China is believed to employ a “two 
man rule,” as well as the separate storage of warheads and delivery vehi-
cles. Positive technical controls include hardened command and control 
facilities, redundant, flexible and EMP-hardened communication net-
works, and the pursuit of new digital microwave communication sys-
tems for all weather and encrypted capabilities. China is not believed to 
employ permissive action link (PAL) technologies but maintains a suf-
ficient land-based and sea-based ballistic missile capability to meet the 
survivability requirements of its minimal nuclear deterrent posture.15 
France has recently placed considerable emphasis on the need to have 
a tailored deterrent that goes beyond its large, cold war posture of “de-
terrence by the weak of the strong.”16 This desire to develop flexibility 
through smaller, more accurate warheads on its submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) is a departure from France’s cold war policy 
of executing a complete sixteen-missile retaliatory response from its 
ballistic missile submarines17 and will require enhanced communica-
tion procedures and C2 planning. France also employs procedural nega-
tive controls such as the two-person rule, technical negative controls 
that include a locking system similar to PALs, and redundant, hardened 
command and control facilities. France’s nuclear launch authority is ex-
pected to remain firmly centralized and under presidential control.18 
Russia has a long history of utilizing a broad range of negative and 
positive controls for ensuring the safety, security and reliability of its 
nuclear deterrent. However, recent Russian emphasis on the develop-
ment and deployment of new Project 955 Borey class submarines, Bu-
lava SLBMs and Topol-M mobile ICBMs, and the 1999 abandonment of 
its no first use doctrine were seen by some observers as a shift toward a 
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preemptive strike posture.19 In response to these accusations, a leading 
Russian strategic analyst remarked that the development of survivable 
strategic systems, at a much greater cost than silo-based systems, repre-
sents a significant investment by Russia in an assured retaliatory strike 
capability. These investments in new delivery vehicles are also accom-
panied by the enhancement of certain aspects of the Russian command 
and control system.20 Similar to the United States, however, Russia has 
significant negative control procedures, including the use of the two-
person rule, employment of feedback loops that allow senior commands 
to monitor subordinate commands, electronic systems that allow higher 
echelons to remotely disable missile launchers, and the use of blocking 
devices to physically prevent unauthorized use of weapons.21 From a 
C2 perspective, therefore, these efforts to enhance the survivability of 
delivery vehicles and communications networks, coupled with a strong 
Russian/Soviet history of negative controls, promotes an overall Russian 
C2 bias toward non-use under crisis conditions.22 
The nuclear arsenal of the United Kingdom is centered on a sea-based 
nuclear deterrent with current discussions exploring the moderniza-
tion of this single-legged capability. The warhead currently employed 
on the British Trident missile is similar to the U.S. W76 warhead and is 
presumed to have similar technical positive and negative control mea-
sures, since the Arming, Fusing and Firing System (AF&F) is reported 
to be designed by Sandia National Laboratory in the United States.23 
The United Kingdom has a centralized strategic release structure, with 
the prime minister maintaining launch authority. In addition, the Unit-
ed Kingdom relies heavily on procedural measures such as two-person 
rules, as well as authentication codes to prevent unauthorized nuclear 
use aboard its submarines.24 
The United States employs many of the technical and procedural as-
pects of negative and positive controls discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, including the two-person rule and use of PALs.25 For negative 
controls within the U.S. SSBN fleet, a “Use Control” system was installed 
during the summer of 1997 that requires the receipt of an external code 
in order to unlock a critical component of the SSBN system (the Cap-
tain’s Indicator Panel Key) which is stored in a safe onboard the subma-
rine. Without this component, the system is unable to launch.26 In 2001, 
the Department of Defense initiated an “End-to-End Review of the U.S. 
Nuclear Command and Control System.” Though many of the find-
ings from the review were classified, some of them included the need 
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to enhance system survivability and hardness due to:  degradation since 
the end of the cold war; a decline in the number of people who have 
expertise in nuclear command and control; challenges associated with 
incorporating a vertical, hierarchical C2 structure with the new broad, 
dispersed mission space of U.S. Strategic Command; and the integration 
of nuclear and conventional capabilities within the new U.S. strategic 
triad.27 A central challenge posed by this C2 modernization is the main-
tenance of nuclear positive and negative controls if certain components 
and delivery vehicles of the nuclear system are simultaneously conduct-
ing conventional operations. This challenge is discussed below.
Though not a declared nuclear weapon state, Israel is believed to 
maintain up to 300 nuclear warheads of various types that can be de-
livered by aircraft, ballistic missiles, and potential artillery. Israel is also 
pursuing an assured second-strike capability through the acquisition of 
three Dolphin-class submarines from Germany. The authority to em-
ploy nuclear weapons rests with the Israeli prime minister and physical 
control of the weapons falls under the defense minister. For negative 
controls, Israel is believed to store its weapons disassembled, with the 
capability to rapidly assemble them and mate the warheads with their 
delivery vehicles.28 Due to the opaque nature of its nuclear deterrent, 
further details about the technical control measures for Israeli nuclear 
weapons are not openly published.
Following the 1998 nuclear tests in India and Pakistan, both coun-
tries forfeited the luxury they previously had of not having to discuss 
their strategic command and control procedures. India released its draft 
nuclear doctrine in the summer of 1999 and began to discuss more 
openly some of the positive and negative controls that it was enacting. 
These included the creation of a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), 
maintaining civilian control of nuclear weapons, the declaration of an 
NFU doctrine, keeping warheads unmated from delivery vehicles, keep-
ing weapon components disassembled with separate custody organiza-
tions, and pursuing a retaliatory strike capability through hardened 
command bunkers and a sea-based leg of the deterrent.29 Some concern 
remains, however, over the chain of succession in the case of the demise 
of the prime minister, the sole authority over nuclear use, as well as op-
erational challenges for the military units who are tasked with nuclear 
employment responsibilities during war but unfamiliar with the weap-
ons for training purposes. In certain circumstances, India is expected to 
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pre-delegate nuclear authority to military leaders to ensure a retaliatory 
strike capability.30
Pakistan has also recently increased its public discourse on its nuclear 
command and control structure and processes. These include an an-
nouncement about separation of the authorities to use nuclear weapons 
from the authorities responsible for executing use,31 establishment of 
an organization dedicated to weapon security, and not mating warheads 
with delivery vehicles. Unlike India, however, Pakistan retains the right 
to first use in its nuclear doctrine. In addition, Pakistan relies heavily 
on negative procedural controls that are slowly degraded during a crisis 
in favor of positive procedural controls (such as assembling warheads 
or mating warheads with delivery vehicles), thus creating a potential 
C2 bias toward nuclear use.32 The implications of this degradation are 
discussed below.
The final two nuclear actors to be explored in this chapter are North 
Korea and Iran. Due to the nascent and secretive nature of both pro-
grams, limited information is readily available through open sources 
about any negative and positive controls measures that may exist, though 
it is expected that both nations maintain a tight, centralized control over 
their limited nuclear stockpiles. On 9 October 2006, North Korea openly 
stated its nuclear intentions by conducting a nuclear test. The technical 
challenges apparently experienced during the test underscore the early 
stages of the North Korean program and the likelihood that any negative 
control measures currently in place will be primarily procedural, such 
as storing weapon components disassembled. North Korea is expected 
to rely initially on aircraft delivery for any nuclear devices it develops 
for operational purposes, with positive controls restricted to procedural 
measures related to the forward deployment of assembled weapons at 
airfields and possibly the mating of assembled weapons with the aircraft. 
In addition, the authoritarian nature of the North Korean regime raises 
concern over the chain of custody for nuclear devices if Kim Jong Il 
dies.33 One U.S. expert who visited North Korea shortly after the Octo-
ber 2006 test remarked, “The officials we met appeared to have little ap-
preciation for the new challenges they faced for nuclear weapons safety 
and security that results from the possession of nuclear weapons.”34
Similar to North Korea’s secrecy regarding its nuclear program, Iran 
continues to claim that its nuclear aspirations are strictly peaceful and 
serve no military purpose. Due to the lack of transparency, analysis of 
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Iranian nuclear C2 is limited to the current understanding of civilian-
military authorities within Iran and its previous command and control 
procedures for its chemical weapons program. Central to the develop-
ment and potential deployment of Iranian nuclear capabilities is the role 
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRCG). Iran maintains a dual 
military structure, with the regular armed forces responsible for the de-
fense of Iran’s territory and political integrity, while the IRGC is respon-
sible for preserving the Islamic revolution. The IRGC is believed to be 
developing nuclear weapons through four military organizations in Iran 
and operates at a much higher strategic level than the regular armed 
forces. Due to the immaturity of Iran’s nuclear program, safety and se-
curity procedures for the initial nuclear devices will primarily involve 
procedural measures such as the separation of warhead components for 
storage; but these procedural negative controls will be forfeited if war-
heads are assembled and mated to delivery vehicles during a crisis (i.e. a 
transition to procedural positive controls). In addition, it is possible that 
an internal security organization may be created to specifically ensure 
the security of Iran’s nuclear weapons.35 
c2 stability dyNamics iN the tweNty-First ceNtury 
aNd implicatioNs For policy
The preceding discussion explores the stability dynamics associated 
with a variety of negative and positive nuclear control measures. This 
assessment highlights the potential stability provided by a non-use bias 
during a crisis when procedural negative controls (such as two-person 
rules, restricted access to launch codes, or a delayed response posture) 
are maintained simultaneously with technical negative controls incor-
porated in the weapon design and positive technical controls that ensure 
system robustness and survivability during combat operations. The brief 
overview of existing nuclear C2 postures provided above highlights four 
key areas where existing command and control systems risk transition-
ing toward a use bias during a crisis:
1. Procedural chain of custody measures (negative controls) in Iran, 
North Korea, and Pakistan that potentially exist without complimen-
tary negative technical controls;
7. South Asian security dynamics and the degradation of Pakistani nega-
tive control procedures during crisis escalation;
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8. U.S.-Russian crisis management during conventional SLBM and 
BMD engagements against third party threats; and
9. Deliberate asymmetric threats against existing C2 systems.
Though Iran and North Korea maintain a greater shroud of secrecy 
around their nuclear weapons programs than Pakistan, all three na-
tions appear to rely on negative procedural controls and the associated 
personnel reliability procedures as the primary means of ensuring the 
safety and security of the nuclear capabilities. With its totalitarian orga-
nizational structure, North Korea may have adequate security for its nu-
clear devices as long as they remain in a non-deployed and disassembled 
status. The safety of North Korea’s devices, however, is most likely lack-
ing since technical measures such as one-point safety, weak links and 
electrical exclusion zones are probably inadequately incorporated in 
their weapon designs. For this reason, policy efforts should focus on not 
provoking any nuclear posturing from North Korea that may include 
the final assembly and potential deployment of their nuclear devices.
Iran poses a significant challenge in that its negative procedural con-
trols appear inadequate if the forces transition into a deployed status. 
Even if they remain under the control of the authorized nuclear com-
mand structure, it would be the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 
which is the more bellicose branch of the Iranian armed forces. The end 
result is a challenge similar to North Korea in that external pressures 
may have limited ability to prevent the acquisition and development of 
nuclear weapons, but ill-considered external pressures may result in a 
deployed nuclear posture and a potential C2 instability bias toward use.
Pakistan, a more advanced nuclear state than Iran and North Ko-
rea, can leverage the influence of external actors to assist in dampen-
ing regional crisis escalation involving India, which is the most likely 
reason for a Pakistani transition from negative to positive procedural 
controls. South Asian security dynamics highlight an Indian C2 posture 
that is biased toward non-use and a Pakistani C2 posture biased toward 
use.36 The geography of the region provides India with sufficient strate-
gic depth to assure some level of retaliatory strike capability, an advan-
tage that simultaneously creates an almost immediate requirement for 
Pakistan to transition toward a use bias in order to present a credible 
deterrent. Pakistani confidence in the survivability of its nuclear deter-
rent can decrease the perceived need for positive procedural controls 
and reduce crisis instability and escalation. Potential bilateral measures 
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that can contribute to a non-use bias during a crisis include the avoid-
ance of counter-force targeting-- including C2 networks and command 
posts—by conventional as well as nuclear forces, and the declaration of a 
no first use posture.37 Overall, the criticality of C2 stability in South Asia 
is captured well by one expert who noted, “A peacetime environment in 
the region will pay the dividend of keeping arsenals non-deployed and 
the safety and security coefficient will remain high. This situation would 
change, however, if regional strategic dynamics lead to formal nuclear 
deployments…”38 Finally, Pakistan may be willing to receive informa-
tion and assistance on negative technical controls as long as this level 
of cooperation does not threaten the security of its nuclear stockpile.39 
This type of assistance can provide safety during regional crises as well 
as scenarios involving theft of a device where negative procedural con-
trols are insufficient.
u.s.-russia
The ongoing transformation in U.S. and Russian strategic postures 
poses a unique challenge and has global implications. Though both 
countries have stated policies that they are no longer adversaries and 
do not target each other with strategic systems, the adaptation of legacy 
weapon systems and legacy command and control processes to address 
new and emerging threats can still place these two nations at strategic 
odds during a crisis. The pursuit of global strike and global missile de-
fense capabilities by the United States significantly increases the need 
for transparency between the two countries, as misperceptions may re-
sult during the employment of conventionally armed ballistic missiles 
(especially submarine-launched) or interceptor flight paths that broach 
Russian airspace. The U.S. Congress identified some of these risks in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 in which Con-
gress calls upon the Secretary of Defense to provide:
a report on the capabilities of other countries to discriminate be-
tween the launch of a conventional or nuclear sea-launched bal-
listic missile; 
an assessment of the notification and other protocols that would 
have to be in place before using any conventional sea-launched bal-
listic missile and a plan for entering into such protocols; and 
a joint statement by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
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ballistic missile will not result in an intentional, inadvertent, mis-
taken, or accidental reciprocal or responsive launch of a nuclear 
strike by any other country.40 
Some of these concerns and requirements can be addressed through 
the execution of the June 2000 “Memorandum of Agreement Between 
the Government of the United States and Government of the Russian 
Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of 
Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launch-
es.”41 This agreement, commonly referred to as the Joint Data Exchange 
Center (JDEC), is held up by legal wrangling between the two countries 
over personal tax and liability issues for U.S. personnel working in the 
proposed Moscow-based center.42 
Figure 12.4. c2 stability dynamics and policy implications 
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An additional bilateral concern involving the United States and Rus-
sia is their maintenance of launch on warning (LOW) postures despite 
their stated non-adversarial relationship. This perceived “hair trigger” 
environment was tested during the 25 January 1995 launch of a Norwe-
gian sounding rocket from an island off the northwest coast of Norway, 
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sian general who served in the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) command 
center during the event asserts that the negative procedural controls in 
place adequately diffused the situation and Russian forces were never 
prepared for launch. The launch commands associated with the Russian 
strategic systems involve four stages: 
preliminary command—after the identification of a potential threat 
from EW systems; 
permission command—upon confirmation of a missile attack against 
Russia, preparation by the president, minister of defense and chief 
of the General Staff of authorization for nuclear use, and delegation 
of use to the three military commanders in chief; 
direct command—submission of launch commands with special 
unblocking code values and the number of the operational plan, to 
launch crews at the operational level; and 
launch command—the execution of the launch order by the missile 
crews.44 
According to the Russian General, only the first level of launch com-
mand was initiated during the Norwegian incident as command center 
personnel recognized the launch as an anomaly and considered it very 
unlikely that the United States would engage Russia with a single sub-
marine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). American officials have also 
stated that their perception of the incident was that the Russian system 
“worked” and no launch authorization was issued over a misinterpreted 
threat.45 Despite these assurances, however, experts from the Russian 
and American strategic communities agree on the need to enhance bi-
lateral transparency in the areas of early warning and data exchange.
A final area for exploration in C2 stability dynamics is the potential 
risks created by deliberate, asymmetric attacks against the command 
and control system of a nuclear nation in order to generate false warn-
ings or unauthorized procedures. These attack profiles may involve 
the degradation of negative control procedures or the manipulation 
of positive control procedures and center on taking remote control of 
command systems rather than physical control of the actual nuclear 
weapons. In the investigations following the September 11 attacks in 
the United States, intelligence officials discovered that one of the plots 
discussed in an Al Qaeda training camp was the hijacking of a Rus-
sian ICBM launcher and forcing the crew to launch their missile against 
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impossible), this asymmetric attack profile represents a scenario that 
merits further consideration and consultation: the intentional manipu-
lation of nuclear command and control procedures in order to execute 
nuclear release.47 Of particular concern is the assurance that negative 
control procedures are adequately robust from a security perspective 
(and safety perspective) to prevent all possible avenues for initiating nu-
clear release. Moreover, the joint exploration of negative controls can be 
conducted without posing a risk to the positive control measures or de-
grading the efficacy of the negative controls.48 Finally, joint discussions 
on negative controls can also cover potential insider threats emerging 
from underpaid nuclear scientists and military personnel serving in 
nuclear duties, a cause of concern in the West.49  This chapter highlights 
the role of nuclear command and control systems in promoting stra-
tegic stability during a crisis. The previous discussion underscores the 
importance of promoting a non-use bias through sustained procedural 
and technical negative controls and assured system robustness and sur-
vivability through positive technical control measures. The end result 
of this balanced mix of control measures is that command and control 
systems are sufficiently safe, secure, and reliable during the transition 
from peace to crisis, and into wartime, that nuclear use never occurs as a 
result of unauthorized or accidental events, and that nuclear authoriza-
tion is less likely to occur as a result of the fog of war.
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